This paper studies the inference of interaction effects, i.e. the impacts of players' actions on each other's payoffs, in discrete simultaneous games with incomplete information. We propose an easily implementable test for the signs of state-dependent interaction effects which does not require parametric specifications of players' payoffs, the distributions of their private signals or the equilibrium selection mechanism. The test relies on the commonly invoked assumption that players' private signals are independent conditional on observed states. The procedure is valid in the presence of multiple equilibria and as a by-product we propose a formal test for multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. We provide Monte Carlo evidence of the test's good performance in finite samples. We also implement it to infer the direction of interaction effects in couples' joint retirement decisions using data from the Health and Retirement Study.
Introduction
Strategic interaction effects occur when a player's action choice impacts not only his or her own utility function, but also other players' payoffs. In simultaneous discrete games of incomplete information, each person has a private signal about his or her payoff, while the joint distribution of such private signals is common knowledge among all players. In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, individuals act to maximize their expected payoffs given their knowledge of these distributions as well as the payoff structure. Such models have found applications in a wide array of empirical contexts where players are uncertain about their competitors payoffs given their own information set. These include airing commercials at radio stations (Sweeting (2008) ) and peer effects in recommendations by financial analysts (Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2009) ).
Earlier works have studied the identification and estimation of these games using a wide spectrum of restrictions. These include (but are not circumscribed to) the independence of private information variables from observable covariates, parametric specification of relevant distributions or utility functions or constraints on the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria 1 In comparison, in this paper we focus on inference of the signs of interaction effects, which are allowed to be individual-specific and state-dependent, under a minimal set of nonparametric restrictions on private signals and payoff structures or further reductions on the solution concept. Our choice of focus is motivated by two considerations. First, signs of interaction effects alone have important policy implications. For example, consider the context of couples' joint retirement decisions as studied by Banks, Blundell, and Casanova Rivas (2007) and Casanova Rivas (2009) . If spouses enjoy retirement more when their partner is 1 Wan and Xu (2010) for example consider the set of monotone, threshold-crossing Bayesian Nash equilibria. Recent work by Grieco (2010) studies a class of games with flexible information structures which also subsume games with complete information where players know each other's payoffs for sure. In a similar spirit, Navarro and Takahashi (2009) suggest a test for the information structure which, among other things, relies on a degenerate equilibrium selection rule and independence of residuals and observed covariates.
retired as well (i.e. interaction effects are positive), then any exogenous change in retirement provisions that force the wife to delay her retirement should at the same time also dampen the husband's incentive to retire. Second, while point identification and estimation of the full structure of such games inevitably hinge on stochastic restrictions on private signal distributions (such as perfect knowledge or independence) and parametric specifications of (such as index specification), inference on signs of interaction effects can be done under minimal nonparametric restrictions on the structure. Such inference is valid even in the presence of multiple equilibria, and does not invoke any assumptions on equilibrium choice mechanism in the data-generating process. This feature of our procedure is particularly notable, as almost all previous works have relied on stringent assumptions on equilibrium selection or multiplicity to attain identification (e.g. single-equilibrium assumption in Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2009) and Tang (2009) , equilibrium uniqueness in Seim (2006) or Aradillas-Lopez (2009) or parametric specification of equilibrium selection mechanism in some other works).
We first show how existence of multiple equilibria in the data can be used to infer the signs of strategic interactions. If private signals are independent from each other conditional on observed covariates, the joint probability of a profile of actions must be the product of marginal probabilities for individual actions in any single equilibrium. When multiple equilibria exist in the data, the choice probabilities observed are mixtures of those implied in each single equilibrium. We show in Section 3 that signs of correlations between players' actions are determined by signs of the strategic interaction effects. The assumption of conditional independence of private information is commonly maintained in the literature on estimation and inference in incomplete information static games (see for example Seim (2006) , Aradillas-Lopez (2009) , Berry and Tamer (2006) , Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2009), Bajari, Hahn, Hong, and Ridder (2009) , Brock and Durlauf (2007) , Sweeting (2008) and Tang (2009)) . 2 The assumption is also common in the literature on the estimation of 2 A recent exception is Wan and Xu (2010) who nevertheless rely on further restrictions on the solution concept and the environment to obtain identification. To handle the correlation in private types, they rely on monotone, threshold-crossing equilibrium strategies and impose restrictions on the magnitude of the dynamic games of incomplete information.
When there is only a unique equilibrium in the data, we also indicate how to exploit an exclusion restriction on states to infer signs of interaction effects. The idea relies on the following simple intuition. Suppose that for some player i, there exists a subvector of state variables which affect other players' payoffs or private signals but not his or her own.
Then the correlation between actions chosen by i and others across different realizations of such "excluded" states must be solely determined by the direction of others' interaction effects on i's payoffs, provided private signals are independent given observed states. Such exclusion restrictions on state variables arise naturally in many applications. For example, in a static entry-and-exit game between two firms, it might be plausible to assume that some idiosyncratic factors affecting Firm A's costs (such as geographic locations) may not enter Firm B 's profits or private information directly.
Another contribution of our paper is to introduce a formal test for the presence of multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. When the number of players within a game is large, the conditional choice probabilities within a particular equilibrium may be consistently estimated from average choices in each game (see for example Brock and Durlauf (2007), p.58) . Nevertheless, when the number of players is small (as is typically the case in the empirical games literature) conditional choices probabilities will not be reliably estimated within individual games. In this case, testing for multiple equilibria is of interest in its own right, as most of the known methods for semiparametric estimation of incomplete information games (without explicitly specifying an equlibrium selection rule) has relied on the existence of a single equilibrium in the data (e.g. Aradillas-Lopez (2009), Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2009) and Tang (2009) ).
3 Hence it is imperative to devise a formal test for the strategic interaction parameters (see Assumption A in their paper). In a subsection, Aradillas-Lopez (2009) also suggests an estimation procedure to handle cases where the assumption is violated, but relies on the assumption that a single equilibrium is played in the data.
3 For an illustration of how mispecification of the equilibrium selection rule can affect inference in a complete information game with a small number of players, see Honoré and de Paula (forthcoming) .
assumption of unique equilibrium in data-generating process. The test we propose in this paper exploits the observation (also mentioned in the parametric model by Sweeting (2008)) that, if private signals are i.i.d. across individuals, players' actions must be independent in a single equilibrium but correlated when there are multiple equilibria. An innovation of our test is to use a stepwise multiple testing procedure to infer whether each individual player is switching between strategies in multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. This is of particular interest for structural estimation of games involving more than three players, where a subset of players may stick to the same strategy across multiple equilibria.
Semiparametric methods using the assumption of unique equilibrium can still be applied to consistently estimate payoff parameters for these players. Therefore it is useful to infer the identity of such players from observed distributions of actions.
Sweeting ( Carlo experiments and an application to joint retirement are presented in sections 5 and 6.
Section 7 concludes.
The Model and Empirical Context
We consider a simultaneous discrete game with incomplete information involving N players.
Each player i chooses an action D i from two alternatives {1, 0}. A vector of states X ∈ R K is common knowledge among all players. A vector of private information (or "types") ≡ to denote the support of any generic random vector R.) Conditional on a given state X = x, the private information is jointly distributed according to the CDF F |X (.|x). The payoff
return from the other action U 0i (X, i ) is normalized to 0. Intuitively, u i (X) specifies a base return from action 1 for player i. Meanwhile δ i (X) captures interaction effects on i's payoff due to another player j who chooses 1. (This specification subsumes that of Sweeting (2008) in the context of binary choices, as it allows the interaction effects to depend on states X and u i , δ i to take general forms.) The return functions (u i , δ i ) N i=1 and the distribution (though not the realization) of private information F |X are common knowledge among all players.
We maintain the following major identifying restrictions on F |X throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 Conditional on any x ∈ Ω X , i is independent of ( j ) j =i for all i and has continuous, positive densities over the support Ω i |X=x .
Assumption 1 allows X to be correlated with private information of the players, as may be desirable in empirical applications. This is a common assumption in the econometric literature dealing with incomplete information (dynamic and simultaneous) games. A pure strategy for player i in this Bayesian game is a mapping s i : Ω X, i → {0, 1}. Under CI, a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in pure strategies (given state x) can be characterized by a profile of choice probabilities
where p i (x) is player i's probability of choosing action 1 conditional on the state x and F i |X is the marginal distribution of i conditional on X. Let L x,θ denote the set of BNE (as characterized by solutions in p to (1)) for a given x and structure θ ≡ {(
The existence of pure-strategy BNE for any given x follows from Brouwer's Fixed Point
Theorem and the continuity of F i |X under Assumption 1. In general there may be multiple BNE, depending on the specifications of F |X , u i and δ i .
We assume that econometricians have access to a large cross-section of games between N players. In each game, they observe choices of actions by all players and realized states
and F |X . Our analysis posits (i) that the structure (u i , δ i )
and F |X are fixed across all games observed, and (ii) that the choice data observed is generated by players following pure-strategies prescribed by BNE.
Econometricians are interested in learning (at least some features of) the structure (u i , δ i )
and F |X from the observable joint distribution of X and (
Suppose the choices observed in the data are known to be generated from a single BNE in the data generating process for all x ∈ Ω X . This may arise either because the solution to (1) is unique or because the equilibrium selection in the data generating process is degenerate in one of the multiple solutions. Then (1) offers a link between observable conditional choice patterns and structural elements (u i , δ i ) N i=1 , F |X . Estimation can be done under various restrictions on u, δ and F 1 , 2 |X (see Aradillas-Lopez (2009), Berry and Tamer (2006) , Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2009) and (Tang 2009 ) for more details).
This link may nonetheless break down when there are multiple equilibria in the data generating process. To see this, let Λ x,θ be an equilibrium selection mechanism (i.e. a distribution over L x,θ ) in the data-generating process that may depend on x and θ. This accounts for the possibility that, "in a game with multiple equilibria, anything that tends to focus the players' attention on one particular equilibrium, in a way that is commonly recognized, tends to make this the equilibrium that the players will expect and thus actually implement.
The focal equilibrium could be determined by any of a wide range of possible factors, including environmental factors and cultural traditions (which fall beyond the scope of analysis in mathematical game theory), special mathematical properties of the various equilibria, and preplay statements made by the players or an outside arbitrator." (Myerson (1991) , pp.371-2) Since X is commonly recognized, we allow it to affect the equilibrium selection mechanism in accordance. For any x such that L x,θ is not a singleton, the conditional choice probability observed in data is a mixture of the conditional choice probabilities implied by
is the actual marginal probability that i chooses 1 conditional on x observed from data, and
is a generic element in the set of possible BNE L x,θ , with l indexing the equilibria in L x,θ and p l i , the marginal probability for i to choose 1 given x and θ implied in equilibrium l. While the fixed point characterization (1) holds for every single BNE p l ∈ L x,θ by definition, it does not necessarily hold for the vector of mixture marginals p
observed. Because the data will provide information on the mixtures of equilibria, not on the individual equilibria themselves, there will be limits to what can be learned about the structure from the data without imposing additional assumptions. This point is illustrated in the appendix using results from the literature on identifiability (or lack thereof) in mixture models.
Researchers have taken different approaches to deal the issue of multiple equilibria in empirical works. Such strategies include (a) the use of a parametric equilibrium selection rule; (b) the assumption that only one equilibrium is played in all games; (c) sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium; and/or (d) partial identification and estimation of the identified set. Each of these strategies (which can also be combined) has some limitations.
We are interested in constructing a robust way to test for the existence of multiple equilibria and to recover the sign of interactions under weak stochastic restrictions on distribution of private information.
Identifying Signs of Interaction Effects
In this section, we show how to detect the presence of multiple BNE in the data observed and identify signs of interaction effects δ i (x) for any i under a given state x. The sign reveals the nature of strategic incentives among players. Compared with earlier works, our sign identification has several innovations and contributions. First, our test does not invoke any parametric restrictions on players' preferences or distributions of private information.
Second, it allows the strategic incentives (as captured by the sign of δ i ) to be a function of states x. Third, our approach is robust to the presence of multiple BNE. If in fact the existence of multiple BNE at first precludes complete identification of the structure, it makes possible the identification of the sign of interaction effects in contrast to states where equilibrium is unique. This intriguing possibility is ventilated for example in Manski (1993) 5 , and clearly observed in Sweeting (2008) .
We first show how to detect existence of multiple BNE in data using observed distributions. Define
where E l denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution of (
For any player i ∈ {1, ., N }, letγ * i (x) denote the conditional expectation of the prod-
, where θ denotes the true structure, and Λ x,θ denotes the equilibriumselection mechanism in the data generating process. Let p * i (x) be the actual probability that i chooses 1 given x observed in the data (i.e. p *
denotes the subset of L x,θ that occurs in the data generating process with positive probability (i.e.
We say multiple BNE exist in the data generating process whenever L + x,θ is not a singleton.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. (i) For any given x, multiple BNE exist in the data-generating process if and only ifγ *
(Sufficiency of (i)) Suppose there is a unique BNE in the data generating process. That is,
(Necessity of (i)) Suppose L + x,θ is not a singleton in state x. Then there exists at least some i and
Also note for such a player i, δ i (x) must necessarily be nonzero. By definition,
can be written as
induced by the equilibrium selection mechanism Λ x,θ defined on L x,θ . Thus (2) takes the simple form of the covariance of a random variable z and a strictly increasing function of itself:
, and the covariance is strictly positive, provided the distributionΛ i,x,θ is not degenerate on L
if multiple BNE exist in data generating process in state x. The case with δ i (x) < 0 is proved by symmetric arguments. The proof of (ii) is already included in the proof of (i) above.
We exploit the result in part (i) to devise a test for multiple BNE in the data generating process in the section 4. Part (ii) 
and there exist multiple BNE in state x in the data generating process. However, the reverse of this statement only holds when N = 2. This is because when N ≥ 3, there can exist i and x such that multiple BNE exist at x in data generating process and δ i (x) = 0, but
Example 1 Consider a simple 3-by-2 game involving three players. Suppress the dependence on x for notational ease. Let u 1 = 0.5, u 2 = u 3 = 0.3611, δ i = −1 and i˜N ( Player 1 chooses alternative 1 with the same probability in both BNE, while both 2 and 3 play different strategies across the two BNE (p 1 and p 2 ) with p
Therefore part (ii) does not guarantee the identification of signs of δ i (x) for all i and x in general, due to the need to distinguish players who do or do not incur the same probability for choosing 1 across different equilibria. Let ι(x) ≡ {i :
When there is a unique BNE at x in the data generating process (i.e. L + x,θ is a singleton), all players in the game belong to ι(x). When L + x,θ is not a singleton, ι(x) only consists of players who choose 1 with the same probability in all
. A corollary to Proposition 1 is that for i and x such that i ∈ ι c (x), the sign of δ i (x) is directly identified as the sign ofγ *
. Additional restrictions are needed in order to identify sign(δ i (x)) for i ∈ ι(x). For any given x and i, define the equivalence class as
(There is no loss of generality in introducing this notation, as we allow the possibility that Υ i (x) is a singleton consisting of x only.)
In empirical applications, the equivalence class Υ i (x) is often a non-singleton set that can happen with positive probability for all i, x. For example, consider entry-exit games involving N firms. The state variables X may include a vector X 0 that consists of market-or sector-wide factors affecting the demand for goods produced. The vector X may also include a group of mutually exclusive vectors (X i ) N i=1 with X i capturing observable firm-specific factors that only affect i's profitability but not its rivals (e.g. X i may include labor costs or local regulations pertaining to the geographic locations of firm i). The vector of private
may well capture all other firm-specific factors (such as idiosyncratic costs) affecting profitability and unobservable to opponent firms and econometricians. In situations where, given one's own states, the rival's states (such as their labor costs) have no bearing on one's own profitability. Then i is independent of X −i given X 0 , X i . In such a environment, Υ i (x) = {x : (x 0 ,x i ) = (x 0 , x i )} where x = (x 0 , x i , x −i ).
Assumption 2 For all i and x s.t. δ i (x) = 0, ∃ω i (x) ⊂ Υ i (x) with positive probability such
More intuitively, the Assumption 2 is satisfied as long as there is enough variation in the equivalence class Υ i (x) to induce changes in p l i (x ) in equilibria that happen with positive probability in data. If Υ i (x) is a singleton (for i), this will happen when x induces multiple equilibria and the p i (x) is not the same in all equilibria. For non-singleton Υ i (x), Assumption 2 may hold even when the equilibrium is unique or when p i (x) is the same across all equilibria. In some empirical contexts, researchers know a priori which i, x satisfy δ i (x) = 0. (For example, when interaction effects are known to be increasing or decreasing in the number of players choosing the same action together, then δ i (x) are non-zero for all i, x.) In such cases, Assumption 2 can be checked directly using observable distributions as Proposition 2 suggests below. The following example illustrates in details how more primitive conditions can lead to Assumption 2 in simple examples.
Example 2 Consider a 2-by-2 game with states X ≡ (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 ) where Assumption 1 holds and u i , δ i , F i |X only depend on X 0i ≡ (X 0 , X i ) but not on the other state variables.
The probability for choosing action 1 in equilibrium is given by
Then Υ i (x) ≡ {x : x 0i = x 0i }. Within this framework, the Assumption 2 assumption can be satisfied a given state x ≡ (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) under several different specifications. First consider the following specification:
with positive probability such that ∀x ∈ ω i (x),
for all t ∈ [0, 1] where j = i is the identity of the other player. (For example, this inequality
The event "1 ∈ ι(x) ∩ ι(x ) and p * 1 (x) = p * 1 (x )" can never happen for any x ∈ ω 1 (x) whenever δ 1 (x) = 0. Suppose it does. Then p
z,θ for z ∈ {x, x } and 2 ∈ ι(x) ∩ ι(x ). Then p * 1 (x) = p * 1 (x ) and the inequality (3) in (S1) suggest p * 2 (x) = p * 2 (x ) for all x ∈ ω 1 (x). This in turn implies p * 1 (x) = p * 1 (x ) in (4) by definition of ω 1 (x) ⊂ Υ 1 (x) whenever δ 1 (x) = 0. This contradicts the supposition that p * 1 (x) = p * 1 (x ). Hence Assumption 2 holds for i = 1 if δ 1 (x) = 0. Symmetric arguments prove the case with i = 2.
Note that when δ i (x) = 0 for either i = 1 or 2, i ∈ ι(x) ∩ ι(x ) and p * i (x) = p * i (x ) for all x ∈ Υ i (x). This nevertheless does not violate Assumption 2, which only restricts the case with δ i (x) = 0. Now we resume our discussion on identification of the sign of δ i (x). Define
where g indexes the independent games observed in data.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, sign(δ i (x)) = sign(Ψ i (x)) for all i, x.
Proof. Let Λ x,θ denote the equilibrium selection mechanism defined over L + x,θ under state x and let Λ * x,θ denote Υ i (x) Λ x ,θ dF (x |X ∈ Υ i (x)) (where F (.|X ∈ S) is the distribution of X conditional on X ∈ S). Note that this is a distribution over the augmented support
and Assumption 2 implies that there exists an increasing (or decreasing) function g i s.t.
Note that this function is the fixed for all x ∈ Υ i (x) due to Assumption 2. Also since ω i (x) happens with a positive probability under Assumption 2, the distribution Λ * i,x,θ is non-degenerate. Then note
. Then the same argument as in Proposition 1 shows Ψ i (x) > 0 (or < 0) whenever δ i (x) > 0 (or < 0) for all i, x. When δ i (x) = 0, p l i (x ) must be the same for all p l ∈ L x ,θ and all x ∈ Υ i (x), and the distribution Λ * i,x,θ is degenerate. Hence Ψ i (x) = 0. This completes the proof.
Finally note that, even when we do not know whether Assumption 2 holds for some δ i (x), we can still make conclusions about the sign of δ i (x) if Ψ i (x) > 0 or < 0. If Assumption 2 does not hold, we will have Ψ i (x) = 0 and failing to reject Ψ i (x) = 0 may be either due to δ i (x) = 0 or the violation of Assumption 2.
Testing Multiple BNE and Interaction Signs

Multiple BNE in Data Generating Process: Wald Test
Below, we propose a test for the presence of multiple equilibria in the data in an empirical context where researchers observe states and players' decisions from a large cross-section of independent games (indexed by g = 1, ., G), each defined by the same structural elements (u i , δ i , F i|X ) i≤N . Semiparametric estimation of games of incomplete information typically refrains from parametric assumptions on primitives or equilibrium selection mechanism at the cost of assuming that the data observed is rationalized by the same BNE (see Aradillas-Lopez (2009), Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2009) and Tang (2009) ). The applicability of these semiparametric approaches naturally hinges on validity of the "single equilibrium" assumption. 8 The procedures below formally test the existence of multiple BNE in the data observed under the maintained assumption of conditionally independent private signals.
The null hypotheses that "multiple BNE exist in the data for state x" is equivalently formulated as follows, based on Proposition 1:
Throughout this and the next section, we focus on a simple case where X only contains discrete coordinates.
Then the sample analog of expectations conditional on x are simple sample averages across games with X = x. We suppress x for notational ease when there is no ambiguity.
Let g index games observed in the data. For any subset I ⊂ {1, ., N }, let
+ 1 -vector consisting of µ 0 , µ i and µ ij for all individual i and all pairs i = j. For example, with N = 3, µ ≡ (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 , µ 12 , µ 13 , µ 23 ) . Define:
where µ G is the vector of sample analogs for µ. By the multivariate central limit theorem,
where 0Ñ is aÑ -vector of zeros and Σ is the corresponding variance-covariance matrix.
. Let T G be a N -vector with its i-th coordinate defined as
Let V denote a N -by-Ñ matrix, with its i-th row V i defined by the following table (where (m) denote the m-th coordinates of twoÑ -vectors µ and V i respectively, and j, k = i),
consistently estimated from average choices in each game.
Then the Delta Method implies
. LetΣ,V be estimates for Σ, V respectively, constructed by replacing µ 0 , µ I with nonparametric estimateŝ
Proposition 3 Suppose the data has G independent games with the same underlying structure. Then
Under the null hypothesis, ∆ = 0 N and the chi-squared distribution can used to obtain critical values for the test statistic GT G (VΣV ) −1 T G .
Multiple BNE in Data Generating Process: Multiple Comparisons Test
In addition to testing the joint hypothesis that ∆ = 0 N in (5), one would also be interested in finding out the identities of the set of players i in ι c (x), who are actively mixing between strategies across multiple BNE (as indexed by p l i (x)). To accommodate this possibility we resort to the statistical literature on multiple comparisons (for a recent survey, see Lehmann and Romano (2005) ). This literature considers decision strategies that aggregate the individual tests for
Given individual test statistics for each of the i ≤ N hypotheses, we employ a decision rule controlling the familywise error rate: the probability of rejecting at least one of the true null hypotheses. More formally: FWE P = Prob P {Reject at least one H 0 : ∆ i (x) = 0 : i ∈ I 0 (P )} where the subscript P indicates the data generating process and I 0 (P ) ⊂ {1, . . . , N } is the set of indices i of true null hypotheses under the data generating process P . A multiple testing procedure asymptotically controls the FWE P at the rate α if lim sup G FWE P ≤ α for any P . Well-known methods that asymptotically control for the familywise error rate are Though less conservative than the Bonferroni method, the Holm procedure can still be improved upon if one takes into account the dependence between the individual test statistics. To achieve this, we follow recent contributions by van der Laan, Dudoit, and
Pollard (2004) and Romano and Wolf (2005) .
9 Ordering the test statistics in descending (1) . In the k-th step, a critical level c k is obtained and those hypotheses for which T G,· ≥ c k are rejected. Let R k be the number of hypotheses rejected in the k-th step (but not the k − 1-th step). Ideally, c 1 is obtained as:
where all statements are implicitly conditional on X = x. Subsequently, c k is taken as
(also conditional on X = x). As pointed out in the references cited, because P is unknown in practice, we replace P by an estimateP G and definê
where we follow Romano and Wolf (2005) and use T * G,(i) and ∆ * (i) to highlight that the sampling distribution of the test statistics is underP G (not P ). We consider three alternative strategies to computeĉ k . We first use the fact that the test statistics have a normal limiting distribution with a consistently estimable variance-covariance matrix.
10 The second and the third constructions use the non-studentized and studentized bootstrap respectively. Because our setting corresponds to the smooth function model with i.i.d. data (Scenario 3.1 in Romano and Wolf (2005) ) both strategies yield consistent tests which asymptotically control the familywise error rate at level α (this would obtain from a slight modification in Theorem 3.1 in Romano and Wolf (2005) to accommodate two-sided hypotheses as indicated in Section 5 of that paper).
Testing Signs of Interaction Effects
This section proposes a simple test for the sign of interaction effects for a player i in a given state x. It relies on the characterization in Proposition 2 and will hold when x induces multiple equilibria and choice probabilities vary across equilibria or when there are excluded regressors as discussed in section 3. To fix ideas, we focus on the simple case with discrete 10 See footnote 21 in Romano and Wolf (2005) .
X where any x in the support can happen with strictly positive probabilities. For any i, x,
When Υ i (x) = {x},Ψ i coincides with T G,i introduced in subsection 4.1. In this sense,Ψ i generalizes T G,i for a non-singleton Υ i (x). For notational ease, we drop the subscript i, x from the estimators when there is no ambiguity. Definê
whereΣ andV are analogous the objects defined in subsection 4.1. It is straightforward to verify using the Delta Method and the Slutsky's Theorem that
Testing the sign of δ i (x) amounts to testing the following three hypotheses:
i (x), we can choose critical regions at the two tails, each resulting the rejection of H 2 in favor of either H 1 or H 3 . 11 Proofs of consistency and asymptotic levels of the test should follow easily.
Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section we explore Monte Carlo experiments to illustrate the strategy presented in the previous section. The first design reproduces Example 1 and displays multiple equilibria.
We use it to analyze the inference procedure on the existence of multiple equilibria and on the interaction signs when more than one equilibrium exists. Design 2 displays only one equilibrium and we use to illustrate our procedure when multiple equilibria are absent, but an excluded variable exists.
Design 1
We study the finite sample performance of the tests for multiple equilibria in Section 4 using a simple design of a 3-by-2 game in Example 1. The design is conditional on some state x and this dependence is suppressed for notational convenience. For some fixed state, let the players' baseline payoffs be u 1 = 0.5 and u 2 = u 3 = 0.3611 respectively, and let δ i = −1 and i ∼ N (µ = 0.1, σ 2 = 0.25 2 ) for all i. Let λ denote the probability with which the first Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in (3) shows up in the data-generating process.
We experiment with λ = 0.1, 0.25 or 0.5 and sample sizes G = 1000 or 3000.
For any (λ, G), we simulate a dataset of players' binary decisions by letting
where in each game g ≤ G, W g is simulated from a Bernoulli distribution with success probability λ, i,g from N (0.1, 0.25 2 ) and p l s are propensity-scores in the two Bayesian Nash equilibria. For each (λ, G), we simulate S = 1000 datasets. For each of the data set, we employ the stepwise multiple testing procedure as described in Section 4.2, and make a decision to reject or not to reject the null hypothesis that "there is a unique equilibrium in the data-generating process". We experiment with three different approaches for choosing the critical levelĉ k in Section 4.2: (i) simulation using estimated covariance matrix of T G ;
(ii) bootstrap; and (iii) studentized bootstrap (Algorithms 3.2 and 4.2 in Romano and Wolf (2005) ). For meaningful comparison between these three approaches, we use the same number of simulated multivariate normal vectors in (i) as the number of bootstrap samples drawn in (ii) and (iii) (which is denoted by B). We experiment with B = 1000, 2000. In Table 1 below, we report the probability for making a wrong decision (i.e. rejecting H 0 rejected for i = 1 or not rejecting H 0 for i = 2 or 3) calculated from the S = 1000 simulated datasets in columns RP 1, 2, 3. Table 2 presents the tests of interaction signs for each of the three players. Since player 1 has the same conditional choice probabilities in the two equilibria, the test withholds judgement for most of the simulations. It detects a negative sign for the other two players.
Design 2 In this design, we consider a 3-by-2 game where the Assumption 2 is satisfied.
The baseline payoff for player i is u i (x i ) = 1 + x i where x 1 ∈ {−1, 2} and x 2 ∈ {−1/2, 3/2} and x 3 ∈ {−1, 3}. The state-dependent interaction effect for i is δ i (x i ) = δx i where δ is a parameter that controls the scale of the interaction effect. The private information i are uniformly distributed over (−c i , c i ) where c i = 2(1 + x i + |δx i |).
12 Table 2 lists the marginal choice probabilities, or propensity scores, p i (x) ≡ Pr(i chooses 1|x) in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibria for each state x ≡ (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ). It is easy to verify the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is unique for all x from Table 2 , as i are all uniformly distributed and all propensity scores are strictly between 0 and 1.
In Design 2, strategic interaction effects are state-dependent and individual-specific.
12 The parameter c i is chosen this way to ensure there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium under each state.
For player 1, states in the first four rows in Table 2 form an equivalent class while the other four rows form another equivalent class. We simulate S = 1000 samples, each with sample size G = 5000. For each of these samples, we calculate the test statistics T * G as defined in section (4) and apply the following decision rule. If T * G < −1.64, then reject H 2 (no interaction effect) in favor of H 3 (negative interaction effect). If T * G > 1.64, then reject H 2 in favor of H 1 (positive interaction effect). Otherwise, do not reject H 2 . Table 3 below summarizes the finite sample performance of our test. The two entries [q 1 , q 3 ] in the brackets report percentages of tests in S = 1000 simulations where H 2 is rejected in favor of H 1 (i.e. q 1 ) and the percentage of rejections in favor of H 3 (i.e. q 3 ) respectively. Recall that the sign of interaction effects for δ i (x i ) is the same as the sign of x i in our design as δ > 0.
Empirical Illustration
As an application for the methodology outlined in the previous sections, we investigate the strategic behavior of couples regarding retirement decisions. A majority of retirees are married and many studies indicate that a significant proportion of individuals retires within a year of their spouse. Among the articles documenting joint retirement of couples (and datasets employed) one could cite Hurd (1990) (New Beneficiary Survey), Blau (1998) (Retirement History Study), Gustman and Steinmeier (1992) (CODA, born in 1923 (CODA, born in -1930 and War babies (WB, born in 1942 (WB, born in -1947 . Finally, in 2004, a cohort of Early Baby Boomers (EBB, born in 1948 (EBB, born in -1953 was included. The HRS cohort has been the most commonly studied given that there are not only more waves of information available, but also due to the fact that the cohort has been more frequently linked to other databases. We use couples where at least one partner belongs to the so-called HRS cohort (i.e. born in the 1930s). Table 5 presents summary statistics on retirement for this cohort during the eight waves available.
Because there are only two players, the statistic G 1/2 (VΣV ) −1/2 T G , calculated as prescribed in the first subsection of section 4 is asymptotically standard normal under the null of no multiplicity and can be used to infer the existence of multiple equilibria and, in that case, the sign of the interaction effects. The results conditioning on age differences between husband and wife (husband's age -wife's age) are reported in Since the decision to retire may depend on more than the difference in age we also perform the analysis above for a set of variables typically used in this literature. We focus on the fourth wave of the survey (1998), when respondents are in their early sixties. Following the literature, in addition to age difference, we condition on household wealth (tercile) and whether at least one member is in poor health. Table 7 presents more detailed information for these variables in 1998 (Wave 4). Table 8 presents the test statistics with the conditioning variables mentioned above.
The statistics are inconclusive for couples where at least one of the partners is in poor health but tend to confirm our previous results otherwise.
Of course, another explanation for the coincidence in retirement decisions (aside from taste interactions) is that husband and wife receive correlated shocks (observable or not), driving them to retirement at similar times. Though this is outside the scope of the model we analyze, we try to measure the extent to which these concomitant shocks may matter by looking at observable shocks that affecting the couple. In particular, we look at the those couples for whom self-reported health status shifts from "very good health" in the previous wave to "poor health" for both partners. Across waves 2 to 8, no more than 7 couples experience such shifts.
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how a condition typically employed in the analysis of simultaneous games of incomplete information leads to a simple and easily implementable test for the signs of interaction effects as well as the existence of multiple equilibria in the data generating process. Inference of the signs of state-dependent and individual-specific interaction effects can be done under minimal assumptions that only require conditional independence of private information, and existence of state variables satisfying appropriate exclusion restrictions. Besides, given that many of the suggested methods for estimating and making inferences in such environments rely on the assumption that only one equilibrium is played in the data, this finding is relevant for the implementation of these techniques. With discrete covariates, such inference is implementable using well-known results in the multiple testing literature. When a continuous covariate is included the testing procedure should account for the boundaries between regions with a different number of equilibria. Finally, the Conditional Independence assumption is also widely used in the dynamic games of incomplete information. We speculate that our results generalize to such games under certain additional assumptions.
Appendix:
Let θ denote the structure (u i , δ i )
and F |X , and let L x,θ denote the choice probabilities profiles corresponding to BNE for a given x and parameter θ. That is, L x,θ ≡ {p ∈ [0, 1] N : p solves (1) for θ and the given x}. We let Λ x,θ be an equilibrium selection mechanism. The following proposition illustrates the limits of what can be learned about the structure from the mixture data without imposing additional assumptions. Let #A denote the cardinality of set A and define g :
Then the structure is not identified if
Proof. We first show that, for given x, the number of equilibria is finite. An equilibrium vector p(x) is a fixed point to the mapping depicted on display (1). Equivalently, we represent it as a solution to the following equation:
Notice that {0, 1} ∩ F i |x (R) = ∅ for any i, given the full support of i . Consequently, for a solution vector,
the Implicit Function Theorem directly implies that the set of fixed points to (6) is discrete (i.e. its elements are isolated points: each element is contained in a neighborhood with no other solutions to the system). Infinitesimal changes in p(x) will imply a displacement of g(·; x, θ) from zero, so local perturbations in p(x) cannot be solutions to the system of equations. Since p(x) ∈ [0, 1] N , the set of solutions is a bounded subset of R N . In R N , every bounded infinite subset has a limit point (i.e. an element for which every neighborhood contains another element in the set) (Theorem 2.42 in Rudin (1976) ). Consequently, a discrete set, having no limit points, cannot be both bounded and infinite. Being bounded and discrete, the set of solutions is finite.
In this case, the observed joint distribution of equilibrium actions is a finite mixture.
Given Assumption 1, the cumulative distribution function for the observed actions is given
For a given x, the problem of retrieving this cdf and mixing probabilities from observed data is analyzed by Hall, Neeman, Pakyari, and Elmore (2005) . In that paper, the authors show that the choice and mixing probabilities (p probabilities cannot be identified, the utility function and the distribution of private components cannot be identified either (or else one could obtain the equilibrium specific choice probabilities and use those to obtain the mixing distribution from the data).
The condition that det
= 0 is likely to be satisfied. With two players, for example, this determinant equals
Also when there are two players, the bound on the number of equilibria implies that, without further assumptions, the existence of more than one equilibrium precludes identification. NOTE: Design 1: Number of simulations S = 1000. G is the sample size. λ specifies the probability that an equilibrium is chosen. RP1, 2 and 3 are rejection probabilities calculated from simulated dataset, with each corresponding to one of the three approaches for choosing critical levels. G = 5000 G = 10000 δ = 0.8 δ = 0.9 δ = 1.0 δ = 0.8 δ = 0.9 δ = 1.0 
